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SUBJECT:25TH CPSU CONGRESS

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1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR REPORT NO. 354 "EASTERN EUROPE
AT THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS" DATED MARCH 12, 1976--ONE OF A
SERIES OF ANALYSES OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CONGRESS HELD
IN MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 24-MARCH 5, 1976.

2. IN COVERING RELATIONS WITH THE "FRATERNAL" COMMUNIST STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE, BREZHNEV PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE NOTION THAT SOV ET RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC COUNTRIES WERE BASED ON THE "SPIRIT OF GENUINE EQUALITY," BUT HE STRONGLY STRESSED THAT MOSCOW'S TIES WITH ITS EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE "GROWING CLOSER AND CLOSER," WITH "MORE AND MORE COMMON DENOMINATORS IN THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL LIFE." AS IF TO UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS FACT, HE SAID THAT IN THE IVE YEARS SINCE THE LAST CPSU CONGRESS THERE WAS PERHAPS NOT A SINGLE POLITBURO SESSION THAT DID NOT TAKE UP THE QUESTON OF SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER.

3. BREZHNEV DEVOTED SPECIAL ATTENTION TO SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; HE TOOK THE 1971 CEMA LONG-TERM INTEGRATION POGRAM AS HIS POINT OF DEPARTURE AND WAS CAREFUL TO SPEAK OF THE STILL CONTROVERSIAL TERM "INTEGRATION" ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 1971 PROGRAM. CEMA INTEGRATION IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL LONG-TERM GOALS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POICY. THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS HAD CALLED FOR THE FORMULATION OFINTEGRATION PLANS. THIS WAS DONE AND NOW NEEDS FURTHER ELABORATION. WITHIN THE PAST FEW MONTHS SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE SAID THAT THE TASK NOW IS TO PERFECT AND TO GIVE REATER MATERIAL CONTENT TO BLOC COOPERATION.

4. RESONSES VARY: ALL THE LEADERS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN PARTIES (WITH THE PREDICTABLE EXCEPTION OF ALBANIA) APPEARED AT HE CONGRESS AND IN GENERAL PLAYED OUT THEIR RESPECTIVE ROES AS MOSCOW'S MOST LOYAL ALLIES. YET THERE WERE DIFFERENCES AMONG THEM, AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE KREMLIN CAUSE AT TIMES SEEMED SOMEWHAT LESS ARDENT THAN IN THE PAST. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS HAVE BECOME UNDEPENDABLE IN MOSCOW'S PERSPECTIVE, BUT RATHER THAT THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION SO EVIDENT IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLICIES WAS REFLECTED IN THEIR SPEECHES AT THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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CONGRESS.

5. EACH EAST EUROPEAN MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT WAS REPRESENTED BY ITS HIGHEST PARTY LEADER (EITHER FIRST SECRETARY OR GENERAL SECRETARY); THE YUGOSLAV REGIME SENT STANE DOLANC, WH HAS FUNCTIONED AS TITO'S STAND-IN FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED WITH MANAGEMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV PARTY BUREAUCRACY. THE SOVIETS ACCORDED "PRIDE OF PLACE" TO POLISH PARTY LEADER GIEREK, THEN SED LEADER HONECKER, CECHOSLOVAK PARTY LEADER HUSAK, HUNGARIAN PARTY LEADER KADAR, BULGARIAN PARTY LEADER ZHIVKOV, AND ROMANIAN PARTY LEADER CEAUSESCU IN SUCCESSIVE ORDER. DOLANC SPOKE AFTER ALL OTHER EAST EUROPEANS. (AT THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

IN 1971, SEE LEADER ULBRICHT WAS THE FIRST OF THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS TO SPEAK, FOLLOWED BY GIEREK, HUSAK, KADAR, ZHIVKOV, AND CEAUSESCU. THE YUGOSLAV SPEAKER IN 1971 WAS MIJALKO TODOROVIC, A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE BUREAU OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA.)

6. MOST DEPENDENT ALLIES ALSO MOST EFFUSIVE: THE SPEECHES OF THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS GENERALLY RAN ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES:

(A)--ZHIVKOV SEEMED INTENT ON SURPASSING OTHER LEADERS IN PRAISE OF AND EXPRESSIONS OF FIDELITY TO THE SOVIET UNION; HE QUOTED FORMER BULGARIAN PARTY LEADER DIMITROV'S

STATEMENT THAT ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE "TOUCHSTONE OF REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT AND INTERNATIONALISM" AND SAID THAT A BULGARIAN'S LOVE FOR BULGARIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE INSEPARABLE;

(B)--HUSAK EXPRESSED THE DEBT AND GRATITUDE OF THE CZECH-OSLOVAK POPULATION TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS "FRATERNAL AID" OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS AS PRAGUE'S "FAITHFUL FRIEND AND ALLY";

(C)--HONECKER DESCRIBED THE CPSU AS THE "MOST TESTED AND EXPERIENCED BRANCH OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT" AND RELATIONS WITH THE CPSU AS "THE MAIN CRITERION OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM."

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(D)--KADAR STRESSED "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM." IN AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE ROMANIANS, THE YUGOSLAVS, AND THE INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, HE CONDEMNED THOSE WHO DISREGARDED "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" AND UNDERMINED "OUR UNITY." HIS FULL, IF NOT PERFUNCTORY, COMPLIANCE WITH SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES REFLECTS THE PRICE THAT THE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP FEELS IT MUST PAY FOR OBTAINING SOME LATITUDE IN ITS DOMESTIC REFORM POLICIES AND BADLY NEEDED SOVIET RAW MATERIALS. WHEN VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, KADAR'S CHARACTERIZATION OF HUNGARIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AS "FRATERNAL AND SERENE" SOUNDED ALMOST GRATUITOUS AND LIKE AN ATTEMPT TO PLACATE THE SOVIETS AND REASSURE THE HUNGARIAN POPULACE.

7. GIEREK'S PERFORMANCE NOTABLE: GIEREK CHOSE TO SPEAK AS A POLISH STATESMAN RATHER THAN AS A PARTY HACK:

(A)--HIS CRITICISM OF CHINA WAS THE LEAST BELLIGERENT OF ALL THE WARSAW PACT LEADERS' SPEECHES.

(B)--HIS ENDORSEMENT OF "INTERNATIONALISM" CONTAINED NO

EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR A SOVIET CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

(C)--HIS MENTION OF BREZHNEV (FOUR TIMES) WAS MADE IN A RESPECTFUL, NOT SYCOPHANTIC, FASHION.

(D)--HE WAS THE ONLY EAST EUROPEAN LEADER TO COMMENT ON IMPROVED US-SOVIET RELATIONS AS A FACTOR IN SECURING PEACE.

IN GENERAL, GIEREK SEEMED MORE INTENT ON ASSERTING POLAND'S STATUS AS MOSCOW'S MOST IMPORTANT ALLY (EVEN THOUGH THIS

WILL NOT SIT WELL WITH OTHER REGIMES, PARTICULARLY THE EAST GERMAN) THAN IN DECLARING POLAND'S UNDYING FIDELITY TO ALL THINGS SOVIET.

8. CEAUSESCU REASSERTS ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE: AS EXPECTED, CEAUSESCU STOUTLY DEFENDED ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENT POSITIONS. HE SERVED NOTICE IN HIS BRIEF, COOL SPEECH
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THAT ROMANIA WOULD NOT DEFER TO MOSCOW'S WISHES FOR GREATER IDEOLOGICAL UNITY. HE UNDERScoreD ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENT POSITIONS AS BEING FULLY RESPONSIVE TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE AND TO THE GOALS OF WORLD PEACE AND SOCIALISM. ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, HE ADDED THAT ROMANIA BASED ITS POLICIES ON "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM."

9. CEAUSESCU FURTHER SAID THAT ROMANIA ADVOCATED COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP WITH "ALL" COMMUNIST PARTIES (READ CHINA) AND SOCIALIST STATES, AND A "NEW UNITY" BASED UPON THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO DEVELOP ITS POLITICAL LINE AND TACTICS INDEPENDENTLY. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT ROMANIA WAS ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN PREPARATIONS FOR A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES (ECPC), HE STATED THAT SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD ONLY BE A FORUM FOR A "FRUITFUL AND DEMOCRATIC EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCE AMONG PARTIES."

10. CEAUSESCU WAS THE LEAST APPLAUDED OF ALL THE EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS. RIGHT AFTER MAKING HIS SPEECH, HE LEFT MOSCOW FOR BUCHAREST OSTENSIBLY ON THE GROUND THAT HE HAD TO ATTEND A PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED AGRICULTURAL CONFERENCE IN BUCHAREST. HE RETURNED TO MOSCOW, WHERE HE RECEIVED LESS THAN PROTOCOLARY HONORS, ONLY IN TIME TO ATTEND THE CLOSING SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS.

11. YUGOSLAVS STRESS INDEPENDENCE AND NONALIGNMENT: LIKE CEAUSESCU, DOLANC STRUCK A DISCORDANT TONE BY REITERATING BELGRADE'S OWN VIEWS ON SUCH ISSUES AS "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," CHINA, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS

BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTIES AND SOCIALIST STATES, AND NON-ALIGNMENT. HE SAID THAT THE YUGOSLAVS ATTRIBUTED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO YUGOSLAV-SOVIET COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP, BUT HE NOTED THAT "EXISTING DIFFERENCES" SHOULD POSE NO OBSTACLE TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS.

12. DOLANC REITERATED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BELGRADE DECLARATION OF 1955 (THE INITIAL RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN TITO AND KHRUSHCHEV), OTHER YUGOSLAV-SOVIET DECLARATIONS, AND THE TITO-BREZHNEV MEETINGS, AND HE SAID THAT COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY AMONG COMMUNISTS CAN BE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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BASED ONLY ON PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, INDEPENDENCE,

AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH MOVEMENT TOWARD ITS OWN WORKING CLASS AND PEOPLE. SIMILARLY, HE MAINTAINED THAT WORLD PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WERE ATTAINABLE ONLY ON THE BASES OF THE "PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY, SOVEREIGNTY, MUTUAL RESPECT, AND NON-INTERFERENCE" (IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES). HE STRESSED THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT.

13. THE TASS COMMENTARY ON DOLANC'S ADDRESS HIGHLIGHTED HIS REMARKS ON YUGOSLAV-SOVIET COOPERATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TITO-BREZHNEV MEETINGS. IT MADE NO MENTION OF THE BELGRADE DECLARATION AND GAVE SHORT SHRIFT TO NONALIGNMENT.

14. OTHER DIVERGENCIES: AS EXPECTED, THE SPEECHES OF HONECKER, HUSAK, ZHIVKOV, AND KADAR CONTAINED AMPLE PRAISE FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP (AND BREZHNEV PERSONALLY) AND FOR SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES. THEIR SPEECHES ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR COUNTRIES' BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

15. PERHAPS SURPRISINGLY, GIEREK MADE ONLY BRIEF MENTION OF SOME OF MOSCOW'S MOST CHERISHED "LITURGICAL BELIEFS"; HIS SPEECH SEEMED MORE NOTABLE FOR ITS EMPHASIS ON POLAND AS AN ALLY OF THE USSR MAKING ITS OWN SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNISM AND PEACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CEAUSESCU AND DOLANC, ALL EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS DUTIFULLY CRITICIZED CHINA. CEAUSESCU MADE BUT PASSING MENTION OF BREZHNEV, WHILE OTHER WARSAW PACT LEADERS HAD VARYING DEGREES OF PRAISE FOR HIM.

16. REFERENCES TO "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," THE ECPC, AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, THE WARSAW PACT, CEMA, "SOCIALIST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION," ETC., DIFFERED IN STRESS AND SUBSTANCE; SOME LEADERS DID NOT MENTION VARIOUS OF THESE ISSUES IN THEIR SPEECHES. WHILE

THESE REFERENCES MAY BE INTERESTING IN POINTING OUT
DIVERSITY IN EMPHASIS AND CONTENT, THEY CANNOT BE EMPLOYED
AS CRITERIA FOR LOYALTY AND FIDELITY TO THE CPSU, USSR,
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OR WORLD COMMUNISM. FOR EXAMPLE, NEITHER ZHIVKOV NOR
HUSAK MENTIONED THE ECPC OR AN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST
CONFERENCE, YET BOTH HAVE PROMOTED THESE CONFERENCES IN
BEHALF OF THE SOVIETS. SIMILARLY, NEITHER HUSAK NOR
HONECKER MENTIONED "SOCIALIST ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,"
ALTHOUGH THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND EAST GERMAN REGIMES HAVE
BEEN AMONG ITS MOST ZEALOUS PROPONENTS--WHETHER OUT OF
CONVICTION OR OUT OF NECESSITY.

7. YUGOSLAVS MEET WITH OTHER MAVERICKS AND SOVIET
LEADERS: THERE WAS, AS EXPECTED, CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY
OUTSIDE THE CONGRESS HALLS AMONG THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS.
THE MEETINGS OF THE YUGOSLAVS, ROMANIANS, AND SUCH WEST
EUROPEAN DISSENTERS AS THE ITALIANS, WHICH APPARENTLY RE-
SULTED IN THE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL POSITIONS THAT THESE
PARTIES ASSUMED ON SUCH CRITICAL ISSUES AS CHINA,
"PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," AND "SEPARATE ROADS TO
SOCIALISM," MUST HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY IRRITATING TO
THE SOVIETS.

18. ON THE OTHER HAND, DOLANC'S ATTENDANCE AT THE MARCH 4
MEETING OF HEADS OF RULING COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATIONS
(EXCEPT FOR NORTH KOREA) WITH BREZHNEV AND THE CPSU POLIT-
BUREAU SECRETARIAT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED IN PART TO
MOLLIFY SOVIET SENSITIVITIES. THE AGENDA OF THE MEETING
IS STILL UNKNOWN. EVIDENTLY THE LAST TIME THAT THE YUGO-
SLAV LEADERSHIP ATTENDED SUCH A SUMMIT OF RULING PARTIES
WAS IN JUNE 1967, WHEN TITO MET WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER
EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT MEMBERS TO PLAN STRATEGY IN THE
WAKE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.

19. POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION TO DIVERSITIES: THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO PAPER OVER THE
DIFFERENCES MANIFEST AT THE CONGRESS, PARTICULARLY THOSE
INVOLVING THE ROMANIANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS. IT ALSO SEEMS
LIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE NO MORE SUCCESS IN THIS
VENTURE THAN IN THE PAST: WHILE NEITHER CEAUSESCU NOR
DOLANC WAS ABRASIVE IN HIS ADDRESS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT
THESE TWO REGIMES INTEND TO STAND ON "PRINCIPLED POSI-
TIONS," WHICH MOSCOW CONSIDERS INIMICAL.

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20. HE SPEECHES OF THE OTHER LOYAL WARSAW PACT MEMBERS, THOUGH IN SOME RESPECTS DIVERSE AND REFLECTIVE OF EACH REGIME' ASPIRATIONS, INDICATED NO SERIOUS OR PRESSING DIFFERENCES WITH MOSCOW. THE KREMLIN STILL HAS POWERFUL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY LEVERS AT ITS DISPOSAL TO USE AGAINST THESE REGIMES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN CONFORMITY, AND THERE IS NO SIGN THAT IT WILL HESITATE TO DO SO IF NECESSARY. RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT OF LIFE BY THE EAST EUROPEAN LOYALISTS, WHO REALIZE THAT THEIR TENURE IS DEPENDENT ON SOVIET SUPPORT, FURTHER GUARANTEES THEIR CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO ALL CAUSES THAT THE SOVIETS CONSIDER IMPORTANT.

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